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SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVITS AND FORMALISM
IN WILLS ADJUDICATION
BRUCE H. MANN*
Few areas of law have resisted modernity as successfully as the law of
wills. The resistance is particularly apparent in the statutory require-
ments for wills, where form takes clear precedence over substance.
Courts routinely invalidate wills because of minor defects in execution,
even when no one questions that the will represents the wishes and intent
of the testator. As one observer has noted, "[p]robate courts do not
speak of harmless error in the execution of wills." 1 Scholars have criti-
cized the formalism of wills adjudication repeatedly and vigorously.2 Yet
their criticism has failed to change the way judges view the formal re-
quirements of wills.
To be sure, when legal academics speak, judges do not necessarily lis-
ten. Nonetheless, the persistence of formalism in wills adjudication is, if
not pernicious, at least curious. Neither doctrine nor function compels
strict compliance with the wills act formalities. If formalism persists, as
it manifestly does, it may be that we have not adequately identified the
impetus behind it.
This Article makes a small effort toward an alternate explanation of
formalism in wills adjudication. It is prompted by an odd and rather
perverse line of cases from Texas. The cases are interesting not for their
content or logic, but because they provide a rare opportunity to observe
the creation, elaboration, and entrenchment of a new formality for the
proper execution of wills--one that treats the use and misuse of self-
* Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis; A.B., A.M., 1972, Brown University;
J.D., M. Phil., 1975, Ph.D., 1977, Yale University. I am grateful to John H. Langbein and Gerald P.
Johnston for their careful readings of various drafts. They forced me to rethink many of my argu-
ments, and may yet wish that I had rethought a few more. I also benefited from early discussions
with William Pannill. Their assistance was collegial and does not imply endorsement. My involve-
ment as a consultant to the executor on the final rehearing of one of the cases discussed, Wich v.
Fleming. piqued my interest in the subject.
I. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 489, 489 (1975).
2. See, e.g., Fassberg, Form and Formalism: A Case Study, 31 AM. J. CoMP. LAW 627 (1983);
Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941); Langbein, supra
note 1; Maxton, Execution of Wills: The Formalities Reconsidered, I CANTERBURY L. REV. 393
(1982); Nelson & Starck, Formalities and Formalism: A Critical Look at the Execution of Wills, 6
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 331 (1979).
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proving affidavits.3 That the cases are from Texas is incidental. Their
value lies in their suggestion that formalism in wills adjudication may
persist because of the structure of the probate process and its historical
position within the legal system. As an explanation of formalism, this
Article can only be partial, but it may suggest a useful way of looking at
an old and intractable problem.
To probate a will, even an uncontested one, the proponent must offer
the testimony of one or more of the attesting witnesses.4 Their testimony,
whether in person or by deposition, simply recapitulates the assertions of
the standard attestation clause-that the testator signed the will freely in
their presence or acknowledged his or her signature to them, that they
signed the will in the testator's presence, and that the testator appeared
to be of the requisite age and of sound mind. If, as often happens, the
witnesses are themselves dead or otherwise unavailable, there are statu-
tory provisions for proving the will without their testimony. 5
A procedure that contemplates producing witnesses to answer ques-
tions about acts that may have occurred years or even decades earlier is
obviously burdensome, inefficient, and unreliable. Self-proving affidavits
lighten the burden by creating sworn evidence of due execution.6 As an
evidentiary device, they are elegantly simple. After signing and attesting
the will, the testator and witnesses merely sign an affidavit, either at the
execution ceremony or sometime later, declaring, in the words of the
Uniform Probate Code version, that
the testator signed and executed the instrument as his last will and that he
had signed willingly or directed another to sign for him, and that he exe-
3. See Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1983); Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.
1966); Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. St. Jude Children's Research Hosp., Inc., 629 S.W.2d
767 (Tex. App. 1981); Rodgers v. Estate of King, 614 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Jones v.
Jones, 630 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); In re Estate of McDougal, 552 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977); McLeroy v. Douthit, 535 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Cherry v. Reed, 512
S.W.2d 705 (Tex Civ. App. 1974); In re Estate of Pettengill, 508 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974);
Cooper v. Liverman, 406 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); McGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d 702
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
4. The procedural details of probate vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The outline
presented here comports with the general pattern.
5. See, eg., TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 84(b)(2)-(3) (Vernon 1980).
6. New York in 1923 and West Virginia in 1932 enacted the first statutes permitting self-
proving affidavits. Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, 1 U. CHI. L. REV.
440, 449 n.29 (1934).
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cuted it as his free and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and
that each of the witnesses, in the presence and hearing of the testator,
signed the will as witness and that to the best of his knowledge the testator
was at that time 18 or more years of age, of sound mind and under no
constraint or undue influence.7
When phrased thusly, the self-proving affidavit is virtually identical to a
well-drafted attestation clause.' In form, the affidavit differs from an at-
testation clause only in that it is notarized and refers to the execution of
the will in the past perfect tense as having already occurred. In effect, it
differs considerably. Wills with such affidavits are self-proving. Unless
contested, they can be admitted to probate without summoning the at-
testing witnesses to reaffirm what they swore to in the affidavit and at-
tested to in the attestation clause.
Self-proving affidavits thus simplify probate by eliminating the need to
secure testimony from the attesting witnesses.9 Moreover, they guard
against the lapses in memory that can occur when witnesses try to recall
a ceremony that may have taken place years earlier. They do not, of
course, prevent will contests. It is doubtful whether they even discourage
them. A self-proving affidavit buttresses the presumptive value of the
attestation clause, but it does not make the attestation clause conclusive
evidence of due execution. Nonetheless, self-proving affidavits make rou-
tine probate-a frequently cumbersome process-more efficient. It is
ironic, then, that courts occasionally use self-proving affidavits to invali-
date wills on formal grounds.
The formal difficulty arises when the signatures of the testator or the
witnesses appear only after the self-proving affidavit rather than in their
customary place after the text of the will. The technically correct form,
of course, is for the testator to sign the will, then for the witnesses to sign,
usually after an attestation clause, and, finally, for all of them to sign the
self-proving affidavit under the watchful eye of a notary. But things
sometimes go awry. There is a potential trap in the procedure that ap-
pears to stem from the exceedingly close similarity of self-proving affida-
vits and attestation clauses. If, for example, the will contains no
attestation clause or spaces for the witnesses to sign but instead goes di-
7. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504 (1983).
8. For a good model of a well-drafted attestation clause, see J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON,
FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS 1437-39 (2d ed. 1978).
9. The advantages are such that thirty states now permit self-proved wills. Schneider, Self-
Proved Wills-A Trap for the Unwary, 8 N. Ky. L. REV. 539, 539 n.4 (1981).
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rectly to the self-proving affidavit, the witnesses have little reason to
doubt that they are attesting the will by signing the affidavit. After all,
the language of the affidavit reads like the language of attestation. And if
there is no place else to sign, the witnesses should be forgiven for assum-
ing that the only available space is the proper one. Moreover, the person
supervising the execution ceremony-an attorney or a notary-directs
the witnesses where to sign. It would be a rare witness that did not defer
to the presumed expertise of the person in charge on a point of such
technicality.1" This last observation also applies to situations in which
the will does contain an attestation clause, but the witnesses overlook it
and sign only the self-proving affidavit. Not only are witnesses likely to
defer to the apparent authority of the person in charge of the execution
ceremony, they are also likely to assume that one set of signatures is
legally sufficient. Two sets-especially to virtually identical clauses-
may strike some people as rather like wearing a belt and suspenders."1
Explanations of why witnesses misplace their signatures are immate-
rial if the question is one of compliance with the formalities required for
due execution. The pertinent question then is whether a court will accept
the act of signing the self-proving affidavit as attestation. If not, the pro-
ponent is left with an unattested will and an affidavit that swears that
something occurred that in fact did not.
In this context it is important to note that there has never been a re-
quired form for attestation clauses. For example, an early Virginia case,
Pollock v. Glassell,2 asserted that the Virginia wills act, which closely
followed the Statute of Frauds, did not prescribe any form of attesta-
tion." What mattered was not what the witnesses signed, but what they
10. The deference is odd given the minimal qualifications required for becoming a notary pub-
lic-in Texas it takes little more than the ten-dollar fee. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5949
§ 2 (Vernon 1962); id. art. 3914 § 1(1) (Vernon 1966).
11. The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code recognized the trap implicit in the incongruity of
requiring the testator to sign twice "even though the entire execution ceremony occurred in the
presence of a notary." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504 comment (1982). In 1975 they recom-
mended liberalizing the method of making wills self-proving by permitting the testimonial and attes-
tation clauses to be notarized rather than demanding a separate, and seemingly redundant, affidavit
with a separate set of signatures. Id. Wills mavens refer to the liberalized procedure as the "one-
step" version and to the more cumbersome procedure as the "two-step" version. The one-step pro-
cedure eliminates the difficulties that prompted this Article. It has not swept the field, however. I
will be speaking only of the two-step procedure. One should not confuse the two-step procedure
with the Texas two-step, which also has been known to cause difficulties for the uninitiated.
12. 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 439 (1846).
13. Id. at 464.
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could later testify to.
A subsequent English case, Roberts v. Phillips,14 took a similarly func-
tional view of attestation. One of the witnesses to the will had signed on
a different page from that on which the attestation clause and the signa-
tures of the other two witnesses appeared. Lord Campbell dismissed the
objection to the will by stating that the Statute of Frauds did not require
an attestation clause or even that the witnesses be described as such.
"Nothing more is required," he wrote, "than that the will should be at-
tested by the witnesses; i.e., that they should be present as witnesses and
see it signed by the testator, and that it should be subscribed by the wit-
nesses in the presence of the testator. . . ."I' The absence of the attesta-
tion clause "would only make a difference in the extrinsic evidence which
would be required to prove that the witnesses had seen the testator exe-
cute the will, and that they signed it with the intention of attesting it at
his request and in his presence."' 6 Lord Campbell's remarks loomed
large in America because the case turned on construction of the Statute
of Frauds, which was the model for most American will acts. Moreover,
he mentioned almost in passing an element that later courts made deci-
sive-that the witnesses intend to attest the will when they affix their
signatures to it. Cases and treatises sometimes refer to this element as
animo attestandi" The Latin that passes for profundity among lawyers
cannot conceal the fact that the requirement is a simple functional one of
attending to what people intended by their actions.
The idea that an attesting intent transcends any attestation form en-
tered American law in 1860 through Mississippi. In Murray v. Mur-
phy, one of the attesting witnesses was a justice of the peace who had
signed the will below his official certification that the testator had
"signed, sealed, and delivered the within will and testament, for the con-
sideration and purposes therein specified, as his own proper act and
deed." 19 He testified at probate that he had used his official certificate
because he believed it would "give greater validity to his signature," but
that he had nonetheless intended to attest to the will.20 The court de-
clared that the certificate, which was superfluous, could not invalidate
14. 119 Eng. Rep. 162 (Q.B. 1855).
15. Id. at 164.
16. Id. at 165.
17, E.g., 1 J. ALEXANDER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF WILLS 675 (1917).
18. 39 Miss. 214 (1860).
19. Id. at 220.
20. Id.
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the signature, which, as the evidence showed, the justice of the peace had
intended as an attestation.21
Murray v. Murphy provided a rationale for treating the signatures of
notaries, justices of the peace, and other officials as signatures of attesting
witnesses even though they might be appended to official-sounding recit-
als that differed from the language of attestation. The leading nine-
teenth-century treatises on wills stated with black-letter certitude that
"[n]o particular forms of words was essential to constitute an attesta-
tion."22 After an English probate case, Griffiths v. Griffiths,23 held that a
man who had signed a will as an executor had also meant to attest the
will,24 American judges had all the tools they needed to treat signatures
to official certificates as attestation. Roberts v. Phillips and Pollock v.
Glassell stated that there was no required form for attestation. Murray v.
Murphy placed the emphasis on the witness's intent to attest rather than
on the literal content of an official certificate. And Griffiths v. Griffiths
legitimated the argument that one could sign with a dual intent. Thus
armed, courts could say, as the Supreme Court of Iowa did in accepting
the signature of a notary that followed his jurat, "It cannot be that doing
more than the statute requires and including all of the essentials of what
it does require fails for not obeying the statute. ' 25
Judges could look so leniently upon ostensibly nonconforming signa-
tures because they were convinced that the signatures performed the
functions of regular attestation. Lord Campbell, for example, took pains
to observe in Roberts v. Phillips that "no doubt is cast on the sincerity of
the transaction."26 And when the New Hampshire Supreme Court ac-
cepted the signature of a justice of the peace, who expressly denied that
he had signed as a witness, it explained that the execution ceremony had
"include[d] every safeguard intended to be provided by the statute. ' 27
Once convinced that the signatures served the functions of attestation,
courts took the position that substance should prevail over form-at least
21. Id. at 220-21.
22. See 1 T. JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 118 (J. Perkins ed.) (2d Amer. ed. 1849); see also
1 1. REDFIELD, THE LAW OF WILLS 232 (2d ed. 1866).
23. 2 L.R.-P & D. 300 (1871).
24. There is, of course, no reason for an executor to sign a will unless he or she also intends to
attest the will. In Griffiths, the witness in question and others testified that the testator had told him
to sign "as executor." Id. at 301-02.
25. In re Estate of Bybee, 179 Iowa 1089, 1090, 160 N.W. 900, 902 (1917).
26. 119 Eng. Rep. 162, 166 (Q.B. 1855).
27. Tilton v. Daniels, 79 N.H. 368, 370, 109 A. 145, 146 (1920).
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on the matter of signatures appended to superfluous certificates. Some
courts declared their preference for substance expressly, as when a Mis-
sissippi court discussed its inclination "to make forms yield to substance,
and to respect what parties really intended to do."2 But most did so
implicitly in the act of accepting such signatures as valid attestation.29
Courts seemed to recognize that it would be unduly harsh to penalize
testators whose only fault was to use more formality than the law re-
quired, at least when the problem arose because of a functionary who
innocently, though mistakenly, sought to enhance the formality of the
execution ceremony.
Against such an established doctrinal background, one would not
think that modem courts would balk at accepting the signatures to self-
proving affidavits as sufficient attestation. Yet some have, and have held
that wills that the witnesses signed only after a self-proving affidavit are
unattested and thus invalid. The earliest statement of this position ap-
peared in 1965 in an intermediate appellate case from Texas, McGrew v.
Bartlett.30  The most authoritative statement, albeit for its provenance
rather than for the force of its logic, was in a case decided by the Texas
Supreme Court a year later, Boren v. Boren.31
Although other states have not always agreed with either the result or
the rationale of Boren, the case set the terms of the debate, both in Texas
and elsewhere. Moreover, it gave rise to a line of cases in Texas that
reveals a process that one rarely observes in its entirety-the creation
28. Fatheree v. Lawrence, 33 Miss. 585, 625 (1857). Kentucky has a long line of cases reaffirm-
ing the proposition that "a substantial rather than a literal compliance with the statute has been
demanded." Upchurch v. Upchurch, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 102, 112 (1855); see Madden v. Cornett,
290 Ky. 268, 273, 160 S.W.2d 607, 610 (1942); Robertson v. Robertson, 232 Ky. 572, 574, 24 S.W.2d
282, 284 (1930); Savage v. Bulger, 76 S.W. 361, 363 (1903); Porter v. Ford, 82 Ky. 191, 197 (1884);
Soward v. Soward, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 126, 132 (1863). But there has always been the caveat that a
"procedure which violates a mandatory provision can not be deemed to be in substantial compliance
with the Statute." Weiss v. Hanscom, 305 Ky. 687, 687, 205 S.W.2d 485, 486 (1947). As a conse-
quence of the caveat, the substantial compliance requirement in Kentucky appears limited to such
questions as whether a witness's mark constitutes a signature, as in Upchurch, or whether the testa-
tor had signed before the witnesses, who could not see the signature, when there was no evidence
that she had not, as in Robertson. This is not "substantial compliance" as scholars use the term
today. See Langbein, supra note 1.
29. See, eg., Keely v. Moore, 196 U.S. 38 (1904); Payne v. Payne, 54 Ark. 415, 16 S.W. 1
(1891); Madden v. Cornett, 290 Ky. 268, 160 S.W.2d 607 (1942); Merrill v. Boal, 47 R.I. 274, 132 A.
721 (1926); Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159 (1885); Reagan v. Bailey, 626 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.
1982); Saathoff v. Saathoff, 101 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 187 Va.
581, 47 S.E.2d 346 (1948).
30. 387 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
31. 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966).
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and entrenchment of a new formality. Boren and its successors thus pro-
vide an unusual opportunity to examine the persistence of formalism in
wills adjudication.
II
Texas added a provision for self-proving affidavits to its wills act in
1955,32 one of the first states to do so. 33 The wills act itself, now section
59 of the Texas Probate Code, was already quite liberal in its approach to
the formalities required for due execution. In addition to the usual re-
quirements of writing, signature, and attestation, testators only had to
acknowledge their signature to the witnesses, who did not have to sign in
each other's presence. 34 The amendment to permit self-proving affidavits
merely continued a well-established legislative policy of fostering simplic-
ity and efficiency in probate and administration.35 Amid the abundant
good intentions of the legislature, it perhaps seemed of little consequence
that the manner chosen to authorize the affidavits was singularly awk-
ward. Rather than add a new section to the probate code, the legislature
amended the wills act itself. Section 59 now consists of one seven-line
sentence that stipulates the essential requirements for due execution, fol-
lowed without a paragraph break by forty lines on self-proving affida-
vits.3 s The conflation of the two sections underscores the close
relationship between attestation and the affidavits.
For ten years there was no indication that self-proving affidavits were
anything other than the "great step forward" that one of the draftsmen
of the probate code proclaimed them to be.3 7 Texas continued to follow
the position that where the witnesses sign on the will is immaterial, so
long as they sign "with the purpose of attesting [the will] as subscribing
witnesses."' 3' Like other jurisdictions, Texas had extended this reasoning
to include signatures that followed official certificates.3 9 Then came the
32. Act of Jan. 1, 1956, ch. 55, 1955 Tax. GEN. LAWS 88.
33. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 539.
34. These remain the basic requirements. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).
35. For example, Texas facilitates the administration of small estates, TEx. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 137 (Vernon 1980), and has a device known as independent administration, which greatly simpli-
fies the administration of estates of any size, id. § 145.
36. Id. § 59.
37. Anthony, The Story of the Texas Probate Code, 2 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 42 (1955).
38. Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393, 400 (1881) (citations omitted).
39. See, ag., Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159 (1885); Saathoff v. Saathoff, 101 S.W.2d 910
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937); see also supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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qualification stated in McGrew I and its elevation to a general principle
in Boren.41
The will in Boren consisted of one typewritten page, signed at the bot-
tom by the testator, O.K. Boren, and a separate sheet on which appeared
a self-proving affidavit signed by Boren and two witnesses.42 The only
ground of contest was the formal objection that the will was not attested.
The supreme court drew an uncompromising distinction between wills
and self-proving affidavits: "The self-proving provisions . . . are not a
part of the will but concern the matter of proof only. . . . The execu-
tion of a valid will is a condition precedent to the self-proving provisions
of Section 59.1143 The court declared that "[a] testamentary document to
be self-proved, must first be a will."" It then observed that "[m]any
reasons support that rule as the true legislative purpose," although it ne-
glected to mention any. 5 In fact, the only thing that approached a rea-
son for the rule was the limited statutory construction offered in
McGrew. The court in McGrew had thought it significant that the artless
statutory conflation of section 59 introduced self-proving affidavits with
the words, "Such a will or testament may . . . be made self-proved
... ,,46 On the strength of the opening words, "Such a will," the Mc-
Grew court concluded that the phrase "clearly imports" that the will
must be signed and attested "before the self-proving affidavit can be
executed."47
The creation and application of what has become known as the Boren
rule are curious. In McGrew, the court at least parsed the statute, if only
woodenly. The court in Boren did not do that much. It cited dictum in
one case on the purpose of self-proving affidavits and approved of the
judgment and opinion in McGrew. Beyond that, the Boren court cited no
authority and did not engage in anything that could properly be called
statutory analysis.48 It simply asserted that wills and self-proving affida-
40. McGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); see supra note 30 and accompa-
nying text.
41. Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 728-29.
43. Id. at 729.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).
47. McGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. 1965).
48. The parties did not give the court much help. The petitioner, who as contestant had lost at
the previous stages, cited only two cases to the court-Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393 (1881), for
purposes of distinguishing it, and another case on the presumptions pertaining to lost wills. Hardly a
Number 1]
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vits, although linked in the statute, are separate and distinct instruments.
As the case law under Boren developed, it became clear that self-proving
affidavits could have consequences that were rather different from those
intended by the people who signed them. Even when judges conceded
that the witnesses thought or were told that they were performing a valid
attestation, they insisted that the gap between a will and a self-proving
affidavit was unbridgeable and that signatures missing from one could
not be supplied from the other.49 It was thus possible to execute a will
defectively after Boren in a way that had not been possible before.
On the facts of Boren, the court had good reason not to avail itself of
established principles to save the will. According to the court of civil
appeals, the witnesses who signed the self-proving affidavit "could not
positively identify the testamentary page of the instrument."50 The nec-
essary connection between the witnesses and the will was supplied by the
attorney who drafted the will and notarized the affidavit. However, he
had also claimed that there was "a lost 'witnessing sheet, '" an assertion
that the trial court had rejected.51 The will in Boren thus gave no assur-
ance of its authenticity, which is a primary function of the formalities of
due execution. There was no evidence to connect the act of the witnesses
in signing the affidavit to the will itself other than the testimony of a
lawyer whose credibility the court had already questioned and who
might be exposed to a malpractice action if the will failed. As a matter of
integration, the gap between the testamentary page and the affidavit was
too large to rule out the possibility that the testamentary page offered for
probate might not have been the one that the witnesses had thought they
were attesting. The finding of the trial court that the will "was in sub-
stantial compliance with law"5" was well-meaning but fundamentally
flawed.
On facts such as these, it is difficult to quarrel with the refusal of the
supreme court to accept the will. The problem with Boren, however, is
thorough legal argument. Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error, Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d
728 (1966).
49. See Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. 1983); Jones v. Jones, 630 S.W.2d 645, 648
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980); In re Estate of McDougal, 552 S.W.2d 587, 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
50. Boren v. Boren, 394 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex Civ. App. 1965), rev'd, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.
1966).
51. Id. It is difficult to see how the trial court could have accepted the lawyer's testimony on
the attestation while rejecting his claim that there had been a sheet of paper on which the attestation
clause had appeared.
52. Id. at 704.
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not that the court rejected a suspect will, but that it chose not to discuss
the facts that made the will suspect. The court could have disposed of
the will on the narrow and proper grounds of lack of integration. In-
stead, it rested its decision on an unqualified and unsubstantiated asser-
tion of a new formality. Such unthinking formalism is objectionable on
several grounds.
First, Boren and the cases subsequently decided under it all turned on
the purely formal question of whether the signatures to the self-proving
affidavit constituted attestation of the will. In most of these cases, there
was little or no question that the testator had intended the instrument to
be a will, that it accurately represented his or her testamentary wishes,
that the witnesses believed that they were attesting the will by signing the
affidavit, and that the purposes of the wills act formalities had been ade-
quately served. It is difficult to see what interests are served by invalidat-
ing wills in such circumstances. The principal justification for attestation
is that it performs a "protective" function. 3 The presence of distinter-
ested witnesses at the execution ceremony supposedly guards the testator
against various nefarious acts, such as substitution of a false will or impo-
sition through fraud or undue influence. Yet attestation is an anachro-
nism, a remnant from a time when will-making commonly was a death-
bed enterprise rife with opportunities for preying upon a weakened and
frightened testator.54 Testators now tend to sign their wills in the full-
ness of life in a lawyer's office. Moreover, attesting witnesses are likely to
be strangers to the testator who, unfamiliar with the testator or the cir-
cumstances or terms of the will, are hardly in a position to "protect" the
testator from any modestly competent scam.55 It thus seems presumptu-
ous for a court to act as though it needs to save the testator from himself
or from others by invalidating his testamentary plan.
Moreover, slavish attention to form on matters of attestation is anoma-
lous in a jurisdiction that accepts, as Texas does, holographic wills. 56
53. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 2, at 9-13.
54. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 496-97.
55. The existence of the attestation requirement has not hindered either the development or use
of separate remedies for fraud or undue influence in the execution of a will. Such remedies are
always available, no matter how perfectly the will appears to comply with the formality of attesta-
tion. The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code recognized the protective inadequacy of attestation
and eliminated the presence and competency requirements for witnesses altogether. UNIFORM PRO-
BATE CODE §§ 2-502, 2-505 (1982).
56. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 60 (Vernon 1980). See Langbein, Crumbling of the Wills Act:
Australians Point the Way, 65 A.B.A.J. 1192, 1195 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Langbein, Aus-
tralians]; Langbein, supra note 1, at 498.
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Holographs are, by definition, unattested. As statutory creations, they
represent a legislative judgment, albeit a tacit one, that attestation is a
dispensable requirement, at least when the document meets other re-
quirements. Those other requirements-that the instrument be hand-
written, signed, and sometimes dated by the testator-are sufficiently
minimal that the cases on holographs are often ludicrous. Alongside the
perfectly serious, well-considered holographic wills, courts have accepted
suicide notes,57 chili recipes,5" and inscribed tractor fenders.5 9 Although
courts have drawn the line at wills written on eggshells,60 one nonetheless
must question the "logic" of accepting such informal "wills" while re-
jecting on formal grounds the wills of testators who tried to follow the
directives of the wills act but whose lawyers botched the job. The key
inquiry in virtually all holograph litigation is whether the testator wrote
the document with testamentary intent. If the court finds that the testa-
tor did, and if the holograph satisfies the statutory requirements, then the
instrument is a will, however bizarre its form. Courts thus routinely in-
quire into the testator's intent in holographic wills, where there is no
attestation, while they refuse to make the same inquiry into formal wills
where there is substantively adequate, but formally imperfect,
attestation.
Lastly, the nearly identical structure and language of self-proving affi-
davits and attestation clauses argue for treating the affidavits as the func-
tional equivalent of attestation, at least when the proponent can establish
the connection between the affidavit and the will. In this connection, it is
important to note that the particular formal defect of an unattested will
with a self-proving affidavit occurs only in wills drafted by attorneys.
People who are not lawyers do not use self-proving affidavits. 6 ' None of
57. In re Button's Estate, 209 Cal. 325, 287 P. 964 (1930). The note was to the decedent's
former husband. It began "Dear, dear Daddy" and closed 'Love from Muddy.'" Id. at 326-27, 287
P. at 965.
58. "4 quarts of ripe tomates, 4 small onions, 4 green peppers, 2 teacups of sugar, 2 quarts of
cider vinegar, 2 ounces ground allspice, 2 ounces cloves, 2 ounces cinnamon, 12 teaspoonfuls salt.
Chop tomatoes, onions and peppers fine, add the rest mixed together and bottle cold. Measure
tomatoes when peeled. In case I die before my husband I leave everything to him-(signed) Maggie
Nothe." Gest, Some Jolly Testators, 8 TEMP. L.Q. 297, 301 (1934).
59. See Comment, Wills--Writing Scratched on Tractor Fender-Granting of Probate, 26 CAN.
B. REv. 1242 (1948). On order of the surrogate court, the tractor fender was cut off and filed with
the court. Id. at 1243.
60. Hodson v. Barnes, 43 T.L.R. 71 (1926). The proponent offered the eggshell for probate not
as a holographic will, but as a seaman's will.
61. There is some question as to how frequently attorneys use self-proving affidavits, even when
they have statutory authorization. Gerald P. Johnston has noted the surprisingly low incidence of
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the printed forms commonly used by people who draft their own wills
contain anything more than a standard attestation clause. Unlike other
formal defects, the Boren mistake is almost always the fault of a lawyer.
If it is true, as I suspect it is, that most witnesses would not think of
questioning an attorney who told them that they were attesting the will
when they were in fact signing the self-proving affidavit, it seems a bit
harsh to treat the wills as unattested. It hardly reflects well on the legal
system to offer a client (or, in this case, the client's intended beneficiaries)
who sought its assistance only the tenuous hope of a malpractice recov-
ery against the attorney whom the client naively trusted to perform the
job competently.
It is easy for courts to fall into the trap of invoking an available formal
ground to reach a desired result without considering the consequences.
It was particularly easy in Boren, where no one had argued that compet-
ing principles in other Texas cases offered a basis for accepting the will or
that there were other, narrower grounds for invalidating the will. What
is curious is not that the court decided Boren as it did, but that the case
took root and made it possible to execute a will defectively where it had
not been possible before.
III
At first, probate courts in Texas did not follow Boren. Between 1966
and 1976, four reported appellate cases invoked Boren to invalidate wills
or codicils. 62 In three of them, the probate judge had initially accepted
the document for probate as validly executed, only to reconsider or be
reversed on appeal.63 The first case, Cooper v. Liverman,64 was an odd
amalgam of the old and the new. In Cooper, the validity of an unattested,
typewritten codicil to a holographic will turned on whether the notary's
signature from a self-proving affidavit executed eight days after the codi-
self-proving affidavits in wills filed for probate in two Kentucky counties. His evidence suggests that
the omission is an intentional one designed to generate probate business for the attorney that drafted
the will. See Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is Good Business
Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 57, 137-39 & nn.511, 522 (1984). It may be unethical for attorneys to
draft wills without self-proving affidavits. See Tex. St. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 360,
reprinted in 35 TEx. B.J. 408 (1972).
62. McLeroy v. Douthit, 535 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Cherry v. Reed, 512 S.W.2d
705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); In re Estate of Pettengill, 508 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Cooper
v. Liverman, 406 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
63. McLeroy v. Douthit, 535 S.W.2d 771 (Tex Civ. App. 1976); In re Estate of Pettengill, 508
S.w.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Cooper v. Liverman, 406 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
64. 406 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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cil could be used in place of the signature of a witness who had not
signed the codicil in the testator's presence. Oddly enough, the county
court admitted the codicil to probate and the district court affirmed.65
The two courts may have had in mind cases that accepted signatures to
official certificates as attestation.6 6 However, those cases would not ap-
ply to the codicil in Cooper if the courts treated the instrument not as a
codicil executed on one date and an affidavit executed on another, but
rather as a single, integrated document, all pages of which had been to-
gether at the signing of the affidavit. If that is how the county and dis-
trict courts rationalized their acceptance of the codicil-and nothing
indicates that it is-the court of civil appeals appears not to have consid-
ered the argument at all. Instead, the court simply quoted at length from
Boren and rejected the codicil as unattested.67
Eight years passed before the next two cases arose. The second case,
In re Estate of Pettengill,68 raised no new questions. The county court
admitted to probate-then reconsidered and reversed itself-a will of
three testamentary pages signed only by the testator, accompanied by a
properly executed self-proving affidavit numbered pages four and five.
The court of civil appeals rejected the will with the explanation that "[i]n
light of the McGrew and Boren cases, the self-proving clause is not, by
law, a portion of the will even though attached thereto, for a will not
witnessed on its body can be of no force and effect as a matter of law."169
The third case, Cherry v. Reed,70 posed a somewhat nicer question. The
will in Cherry consisted of two pages. The last two lines of the final
testamentary paragraph carried over to the second page, followed imme-
diately by a self-proving affidavit, with no place for the testator and wit-
nesses to sign except after the affidavit. The proponents of the will seem
to have taken a functional approach in their effort to limit the scope of
Boren. They argued that the placement of the affidavit on the last page of
the will provided "less opportunity for fraud than if the affidavit had
been separately attached."71 The court thought the argument "persua-
65. 406 S.W.2d at 929-30.
66. See, eg., Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159 (1885); Saathoff v. Saathoff, 101 S.W.2d 910
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
67. 406 S.W.2d at 932-33.
68. 508 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
69. Id. at 465.
70. 512 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
71. Id. at 707.
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sive" but nonetheless foreclosed by Boren.72
The fourth case, McLeroy v. Douthit7 3 may also be the most egregious.
Although only the testator had signed the will, he and the two witnesses
had at the same time executed a self-proving affidavit on a separate
sheet-six weeks before the effective date of the statute that authorized
the affidavits. The probate court admitted the will to probate, but the
court of civil appeals reversed on the strength of McGrew and Boren.7 4
The date of the affidavit might have provided the court a way to avoid
Boren, had it been so inclined. The court observed-erroneously-that
because the testator executed the affidavit before it was legally effective,
"it would constitute nothing of any consequence as applied to the trans-
action."75 If, however, the affidavit truly was of no consequence as an
affidavit, the court could have followed long-established Texas authority
and accepted the signatures to the affidavit as attestation of the will.76
That it did not suggests the growing strength of the formalism of Boren.
The next decision in the line, In re Estate of McDougal,77 marked what
in retrospect proved to be the last step in securing the unquestioned au-
thority of Boren. Only then, eleven years after the Texas Supreme Court
first announced the rule that signatures to self-proving affidavits did not
constitute attestation, could a court refer to "[t]he well-settled law in
regard to Section 59. " 17 The probate court in McDougal denied probate
to a three-page codicil that the testator had signed at the bottom of the
second page. The third page was a self-proving affidavit signed by the
testator and the two witnesses. At the application for probate of the
codicil, the witnesses identified the three-page document as the one they
had signed. They testified that they "considered the three fastened, con-
secutively numbered pages to be one document" and that in signing the
third page they "intended to-and believed they did-witness and attest"
to the execution of the codicil.7 9 The proponent also argued that the
three-page instrument "constituted a single integrated document."80 All
72. Id.
73. 535 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
74, Id. at 774.
75. Id. at 773.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
77, 552 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
78, Id. at 588.
79, Id.
80. Id. at 587.
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to no avail. The court denied probate and the court of civil appeals
affirmed.
McDougal is significant because, unlike the four previous cases decided
under Boren, no one had contested the application for probate of the
codicil. When there are no contestants, the probate judge who finds a
formal defect in the will does so on his or her own initiative. Although
there is no empirical evidence on the point other than of the unsystematic
war-story variety, probate judges will on occasion overlook or construe
away formal defects that they deem harmless when they are not faced
with a contestant who stands on formality. By the time the will in Mc-
Dougal was offered for probate, however, at least one probate judge be-
lieved that Boren had become sufficiently all-encompassing to make
lenience impossible, even in uncontested cases. After McDougal, the law
truly was "well-settled." The few cases that followed were all rather des-
ultory appeals from denials of probate that the courts disposed of with
perfunctory citations to Boren.8 The formalism of Boren reigned
supreme.
How supreme can be seen in the most recent challenge to Boren, Wich
v. Fleming.82 Fleming was the first case in which anyone argued that
Boren was a departure from previous principles rather than the continua-
tion of them it purported to be. The will in Fleming consisted of three
testamentary pages and a self-proving affidavit that was entirely con-
tained on the remainder of the third page with the exception of the no-
tary's jurat. The will, executed in December 1979, was that of Mabel
Giddings Wilkin, who was the first, and for many years the only, female
psychoanalyst in Texas. The only spaces for the witnesses' signatures
were after the self-proving affidavit. Wilkin signed her name once after
the body of the will and again with the two witnesses on the bottom of
the same page at the end of the affidavit.83 The witnesses, who were the
attorney who drafted the will and an employee of the bank where the
signing took place, testified that they believed they were attesting the
will.4 The attorney had drafted three earlier wills for Wilkin, each of
81. Jones v. Jones, 630 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Rodgers v. Estate of King, 614
S.W.2d 896 (rex. Civ. App. 1981); Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. St. Jude Children's
Research Hosp., Inc., 629 S.W.2d 767 (rex. App. 1981).
82. 652 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1983).
83. Wilkin also signed her name at the bottom of the first page, evidently for purposes of
identification.
84. Deposition of William Harvey Betts, at 75, 79, 82; Deposition of Florence Lucille Bentke at
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which also omitted the attestation clause.85
Wilkin died at the age of eighty-three in April 1980, survived by three
nieces and two nephews. The will named the three nieces co-executors of
the estate and co-trustees of a small trust created by the will to establish a
memorial to her grandparents and other early settlers of Washington
County, Texas. Wilkin gave nothing to her nephews, divided the shares
in the family ranch equally among her nieces, and gave one niece, Marian
Fleming, all of her oil and gas properties, which were substantial. Flem-
ing offered the will for probate. Not surprisingly, her cousins contested.
The only surprise was that the court of appeals reversed the district
court's summary denial of probate and admitted the will despite Boren.86
The court of appeals distinguished Boren on the ground that the signa-
tures to Wilkin's will, unlike those to Boren's, appeared on the same page
as the will itself. On that basis, the court concluded that "[w]here, as
here, the witnesses sign on the face of the will and testify that they did so
with the purpose of witnessing the will, we think the language of the self-
proving affidavit is superfluous."8 7 It noted that other Texas cases held
that the witnesses need not sign in a particular place and that the circum-
stances of the signing may provide evidence of their intent to act as wit-
nesses. Under that authority, the witnesses had in fact "subscribe[d]
their names" to the will within the meaning of the statute.88 The court
asserted that none of the previous cases decided under Boren were "on
point with the fact situation before us" and specifically declined to follow
Boren-'"to apply the Boren rule to the facts before us would be to exalt
form over substance. The Boren rule should not be blindly applied to
defeat the right of the testatrix to dispose of her estate as she desired."89
18. Moreover, all parties agreed that the testator and witnesses believed they were executing the will
in proper fashion. Fleming v. Wich, 638 S.W.2d 31, 36 n.l (Tex. App. 1982).
85. When the executor asked the attorney, who had never heard of Boren, why he had omitted
the attestation clause, he replied, "I don't know any reason for it [the omission], except maybe the
Lord had something to do with it. Maybe the Lord had some part in it." Deposition of Betts, supra
note 84, at 84. The attorney's apparent belief in immaculate attestation would, of course, be relevant
in any subsequent malpractice action.
86. Fleming v. Wich, 638 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App. 1982).
87. Id. at 35.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 35-36. In overruling the contestants' motion for rehearing, the court of appeals noted
a further reason to admit the will. Fleming had not rested her application for probate of the will on
the affidavit. Instead, she produced the sworn testimony of the witnesses, just as one would to prove
a will that had not been made self-proving. The court of appeals reasoned that:
We do not believe the legislature . . . intended that statute [i.e., Section 59] to deny a
testatrix her right to dispose of her property through a technicality; rather, as we see it, the
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The decision attracted considerable attention. It was, after all, the first
appellate resistance to Boren in sixteen years. The victory, however, was
short-lived. Eleven months later the supreme court reversed, albeit over
a spirited dissent.90
The supreme court initially reversed the court of appeals in a per
curiam opinion without hearing oral argument. 91 The court cited Boren
and the two most recent cases decided under it and simply declared with-
out discussion or explanation that "[t]he decision of the Court of Appeals
conflicts with Boren v. Boren."92 The court, however, granted the propo-
nent's motion for a rehearing and set the case for oral argument.93 Yet
despite its apparent willingness to reconsider the case-and perhaps Bo-
ren-the court in its final decision repeated the basic Boren arguments
and did not address the questions Fleming had raised. Except in the
dissent, there was no mention of Fowler v. Stagner, Franks v. Chapman,
or any of the other cases that had held that where the witnesses sign is
immaterial and that signatures after a certificate are proper attestation.94
Instead, the reflexive application of Boren to Wilkin's will suggests that
the formalism of Boren had become so deeply embedded in the way
judges thought about the problem that they could not view self-proving
affidavits in any other light. Three reasons that the court offered for its
decision strengthen that impression.
The court began by stating that it had held in Boren "that a will was
not admissible to probate if the witnesses had signed only the self-proving
affidavit attached to the will."95 It then gave the first explanation ever
offered for that holding: "The premise of this holding was that the will
and the self-proving affidavit require different types of intent on the part
of the witness and serve different purposes."96 The different types of in-
tent were the "present intent to act as a witness" and "swearing to the
validity of an act already performed." 97 And the different purposes were
purpose of the self-proving affidavit is to provide an alternative way of proving the will.
Appellants have not used the self-proving affidavit in such proof. They have provided the
witnesses.
Id. at 36. Post-mortem conduct, however, cannot cure a defect in execution.
90. Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. 1983).
91. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 48 (Oct. 13, 1982).
92. Id. at 49.
93. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 105 (Nov. 24, 1982).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
95. 652 S.W.2d at 354.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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to "validate[] an otherwise properly executed will" and "to eliminate the
necessity for the testimony of the subscribing witnesses."98 In truth,
nothing in Boren suggests that this "premise" was anything more than a
rationalization fashioned long after the fact. By ignoring the uncontro-
verted evidence that the witnesses had intended to attest the will when
they signed the affidavit and in fact believed that they were attesting the
will, the Fleming court made the rather remarkable assumption that in-
tent is a question of law rather than of fact, at least for determining the
adequacy of attestation.
Second, the court took the position that the will and the self-proving
affadavit were separate instruments, even though they appeared on the
same page.99 It thus dismissed Fleming's suggestion that the signatures
qualified as attestation because they were in fact subscribed below the
testator's signature, as the statute requires."°° The court declared acer-
ibically that "[w]e cannot assume the parties signing the affidavit, one of
whom was an attorney, did not read and were unaware of the language of
the affidavit and its import.""'' Yet, as the witnesses testified, the affida-
vit was read aloud at the execution ceremony, and they both thought
they were attesting the will.' 02 Moreover, section 59 expressly states that
"[a] self-proved will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of
any subscribing witness, but otherwise it shall be treated no differently
than a will not self-proved."' 0 3 Even the Boren court had recognized that
"[i]t was not the purpose of the Legislature to amend or repeal the re-
quirement that the will itself must meet the requirements of the law."'
Those requirements, as consistently interpreted in Texas since 1881, had
permitted the witnesses to sign anywhere as long as they did so with the
intent to attest the will, even if they signed after an official certificate.
Finally, the supreme court claimed tacit legislative approval for its po-
sition. "It is significant to note," it declared, that "the Legislature has
amended section 59 of the Probate Code twice since the date of the Boren
decision, but has not modified the statutory requirements at issue
here."' 0 5  The court neglected to mention that the two amendments
98. Id.
99. Id. at 355.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
103. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).
104. 402 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. 1966).
105. 652 S.W.2d at 355.
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hardly represented substantive considerations of either attestation or the
affidavits. The first amendment, in 1969, simply lowered the minimum
age for testators to eighteen as part of a general reduction in the age of
majority in the state.1 1 6 The legislature in fact paid so little attention to
section 59 that, when it reenacted the section with the age adjustment, it
neglected to reenact part of the statute. To redress its oversight, the leg-
islature amended section 59 for the second time at its next session in
1971-for the sole purpose of restoring the omitted paragraph.107 More-
over, in 1971 the legislature had no reason to rethink how courts had
applied section 59 because no court had extended Boren beyond its facts.
It is thus difficult to believe that the legislature approved of Boren, when
it in fact never considered either the case or its implications.
Fleming represents a triumph of formalism in wills adjudication. It is
curious that after eighty years of ignoring the literal form of official cer-
tificates and treating them substantively as attestation, the Texas
supreme court would draw the line at a device that the legislature had
adopted to simplify probate. It -is more curious because, even after Bo-
ren, courts in Texas apparently remained willing to accept the signature
of a notary to his jurat as attestation.1 0 8 Odd as it may seem, the rule in
Texas appears to be that a superfluous certificate of acknowledgment will
suffice as attestation unless it is a self-proving affidavit-the one form of
certificate that recites everything to which attesting witnesses are sup-
posed to testify.
Some states have found this position too uncompromising. Oklahoma,
for example, which some people might argue would never knowingly fol-
low Texas on anything, has a wills act that closely resembles section 59 of
the Texas Probate Code, even to the authorization of self-proving affida-
vits that begins, "Such a will or testament. . 109 Yet, two years after
106. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 641, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 1923-24.
107. Act of Jan. 1, 1972, ch. 173, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 974. See also Bill Analysis to S.B. 225, at
4 (available at Texas State Library, Austin).
108. In 1981, a division of the court of appeals, which included Justice Massey, who wrote the
opinion in McLeroy v. Douthit, see supra text accompanying notes 73-76, accepted the signature of a
notary below his jurat as attestation of a codicil. Reagan v. Bailey, 626 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.
1981). As authority, the court cited Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159 (1885) and Saathoff v.
Saathoff, 101 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)-the two cases that had long stood for the proposi-
tion that courts may treat signatures after official certificates as attestation. 626 S.W.2d at 142-43.
The court did not refer to Boren or any of its progeny by name, but simply stated: "Contestant cites
cases in support of the argument in will cases involving self-proving affidavits. It is our opinion that
those cases are not authority in this case." Id. at 142.
109. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84 § 55 (West 1970).
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Boren, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that since attestation
clauses do not have to be in any particular form, they are not invalid
merely because they look like self-proving affidavits, at least when the
proponent produces the witnesses at probate and does not rely on the
affidavit to establish the will. "o The court dismissed Boren and McGrew
with the remark that it "need express no opinion as to the courts' reason-
ing" in the two cases.11' Faced with the same question ten years later, a
Florida court was more blunt: "The Texas view places form above sub-
stance and we decline to follow it.""' 2 The Supreme Court of Kansas
delivered perhaps the most telling rejection in 1980 when it ignored Bo-
ren altogether in holding that "[t]he mere fact that the attestation, in
form, resemble[s] an affidavit, does not destroy its validity."11 On the
other hand, Boren has made a mark, notably in Montana, which has ac-
cepted it unquestioningly," 4 and Arizona, whiich has commented on it
favorably, but on equivocal facts." 5
The primary interest of Boren and the 1: ie of cases culminating in
Fleming is that they force us to ask why formalism persists in wills adju-
dication. Formalism is not, of course, necessarily evil. The statutory re-
quirements for formal wills ease the transfer of property at death by
taking the vast array of testamentary things and channeling them into a
form that is easily recognizable as a will.' 16 The requirements of writing,
signature, and attestation impose a standard form on testamentary in-
struments that permits probate courts to identify documents as wills
solely on the basis of readily ascertainable formal criteria.' 17 The formal-
ities thus routinize probate in the large majority of cases.118
110. In re Estate of Cutsinger, 445 P.2d 778 (Okla. 1968).
111. Id. at 782. Perhaps as interesting as its rejection of Boren is the fact that the court held that
the attestation in question "was in substantial compliance with the provisions of see. 55." Id.
112. In re Estate of Charry, 359 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
113. In re Estate of Petty, 227 Kan. 697, 702, 608 P.2d 987, 992 (Kan. 1980).
114. In re Estate of Sample, 175 Mont. 93, 97, 572 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Mont. 1977).
115. In re Estate of Mackaben, 126 Ariz. 599, 601, 617 P.2d 765, 767 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). See
Effland, Self-Proved Wills, 16 ARIZ. B.J. 31 (Feb. 1981).
116. See Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801-03 (1941); Langbein,
supra note 1, at 493-94.
117. American wills acts are a diverse lot. Some consist of only a single sentence. Others are
intricate prescriptions that cover as many pages as they do contingencies. They are collected in 1
WILLS EsT. & TR. (P-H) 1005.
118. Lawrence M. Friedman noted the relationship between the formalities and efficient admin-
istration of probate when he observed that:
[Flormalities of execution, rule, and administration in the law of succession standardize
and guide the process of transmitting billions of dollars of assets from generation to genera-
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The problem lies not with the formalities, but with judicial insistence
on literal compliance with them. The only legitimacy of the formalities is
that they signify that functions deemed essential to the process have been
fulfilled. 119 Whether or not the functions have been served is, or at least
should be, a separate question from whether the formalities have been
met. The latter is only evidence, albeit presumptive evidence, of the
former. Since the presumption is not conclusive, it seems a rather shaky
foundation upon which to rest a judicial requirement of strict compliance
with the formalities. Courts, however, routinely invalidate wills on for-
mal grounds despite ample evidence that the document offered for pro-
bate accurately represents the testator's intent.1 20
Scholars have roundly and persistently criticized such formalism., 2
The most forceful recent critic is John H. Langbein, who has argued that
judges should accept substantial compliance with the wills act formalities
in appropriate circumstances.122 Rather than invalidating formally defec-
tive wills automatically, Langbein contends, courts should inquire into
whether the erring document nonetheless expresses the decedent's testa-
mentary intent and whether its form, however imprecise, gives sufficient
assurance that the purposes of the wills act formalities have been served.
If a proponent, unaided by the usual presumptions, can satisfy a court on
tion ... The substance of wills (what they actually say) cannot be standardized. It may be
all the more important that the documents be standardized in form.
Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession and Society, 1966 Wis.
L. REv. 340, 368.
119. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 2, at 9-13; Langbein, supra note 1, at 491-98.
120. In their deference to rules in this area, American judges behave like their English counter-
parts. See Atiyah, Lawyers and Rule" Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 37 Sw. L.J. 545 (1983).
121. See authorities cited supra note 2. In fact, all of the major trusts and estates casebooks but
one reprint excerpts from the Gulliver and Tilson article or from Langbein's article or from both.
See E. CLARK, L. LUSKY, & A. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS:
WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS, GIFTS AND FUTURE INTERESTS 271-77 (2d ed. 1977); J.
DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 183-86 (3rd ed. 1984); S. KURTZ,
PROBLEMS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING 57-62 (1983); W. Mc-
GOVERN, JR., WILLS, TRUSTS AND FUTURE INTERESTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE PLAN-
NING, CASES AND MATERIALS 105-06, 119-21 (1983); E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 112-15 (3d ed. 1981); L. SOLOMON,
TRUSTS AND ESTATES: A BASIC COURSE, PROBLEMS, PLANNING AND POLICY 201-04, 215, 233-39
(1981); R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER, & 0. BROWDER, JR., PALMER'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 129-32 (4th ed. 1983); H. WILLIAMS, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND
TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 131-32 (1968). The one nonconforming casebook treats the func-
tional schemes in textual form, with occasional citation to Gulliver and Tilson and to Langbein. J.
RITCHIE, N. ALFORD, JR., & R. EFFLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 192-202 (6th ed. 1982).
122. See Langbein, supra note 1.
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these points, the court should find the will in substantial compliance with
the formal requirements of the wills act and admit it to probate. 123
Whether one views the question of the effect probate courts should
give signatures to self-proving affidavits as one of literal compliance, as
Langbein would, or as one of substantial compliance, the problem re-
mains of why formalism persists in wills adjudication. It is tempting
simply to explain the phenomenon in terms of unenlightened, dogmatic
judges. The same judges, however, often show far greater flexibility in
other areas of law, such as contracts or commercial law, where they do
not feel constrained to stay within the four comers of the document.1 24
A more traditional explanation is that courts have a deep and abiding
anxiety about attempting to divine the intent of people now dead. 121 If
the frequent inquiries into the testator's intent in holographic will cases
are any indication, the divination is not one that requires resort to occult
aids such as tea leaves or entrails.1 26 Moreover, the widespread repeal of
123. Langbein's proposal is both elegantly simple and eminently sensible. Unfortunately, except
for a single Pennsylvania case, Kajut Will, 2 Pa. Fiduc. 2d 197 (Orphans' Ct. 1981), it has found
legal favor only outside the United States-notably in Australia. See Wills Act, § 12(2) S. Austl.
Sess. Stat. 1936-1975, discussed in Langbein, Australians, supra note 56, and Palk, Informal Wills:
From Soldiers to Citizens, 5 ADEL. L. REv. 383 (1976); Succession Act § 9(a) 1981 Queensl. Stat.
No. 69.
There have been other statutory proposals of a substantial compliance standard, as well as applica-
tion of it in Israel and West Germany. See the discussions and citations in Langbein, Defects of
Form in the Execution of Wils" Australian and Other Experience with the Substantial Compliance
Doctrine, reprinted in American Bar Association, AMERICAN/AUSTRALIAN/NEW ZEALAND LAW:
PARALLELS AND CoNTRAsTS 59 (1980); J. RiTcHIE, N. ALFORD, JR. & R. EFFLAND, supra note
121, at 199; Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of
Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 521, 570 n.188 (1982).
124. For example, as Langbein has noted, courts use the main purpose and part performance
rules to sustain transactions that do not comply with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. See
Langbein, supra note 1, at 498-99.
125. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 2, at 3; Langbein, supra note 1, at 492, 501-02. One might
argue, only half-facetiously, that discovering the intent of people after their deaths should be no
more difficult than the searches for legislative intent or the "intent of the Framers" that courts
undertake as a matter of course.
126. The inquiry into testamentary intent is also a central part of "sham will" cases, where the
contestant argues that the testator never intended the document to be a will, even though it meets
the formal requirements. For example, Masonic initiation rites required members who did not have
wills to make one as part of the ceremony. Some members complied solely for purposes of the
initiation without intending the documents to be their wills. See, eg., Vickery v. Vickery, 126 Fla.
294, 170 So. 745 (1936); Shiels v. Shiels, 109 S.W.2d 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); In re Estate of
Watkins, 116 Wash. 190, 198 P. 721 (1921). Then there is the case of Francis M. Butterfield, who
told the attorney who drafted his will that it "was a 'fake' will" made to induce the sole legatee to
sleep with him. Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 72 N.E. 499 (1904). See Langbein, supra note
1, at 514; Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 123, at 541-43.
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"dead man" statutes in the law of evidence makes continued deference
on the point in the law of wills anomalous.
127
The conventional explanations for the persistence of formalism-con-
venience, custom, qualms about communicating with the dead-all have
superficial appeal, and they all may in some part contribute to the result.
Yet none of them taken alone is compelling, and even considered to-
gether they are unsatisfactory. They do not explain why courts would go
out of their way to create what amounts to a new formality, as the Texas
courts did in Boren and Fleming. If doctrinal or functional analyses ex-
plained formalism completely, formalism should have yielded to the doc-
trinal and functional criticism it has received. That it has not suggests
that we have not identified all of its sources. To this end, we might gain a
better perspective if we consider the traditional structure of the probate
process.
IV
Probate courts in most states customarily were courts of inferior status
and limited jurisdiction.128 The office of probate judge was often a part-
time one that required little, if any, professional training. 129 The respon-
sibilities of the probate judge tended to be ministerial, and any contested
questions went to trial courts of general jurisdiction without a hearing in
the probate court. The functions of probate courts in wills matters were
essentially administrative-to determine whether or not to accept the
will for probate, issue the necessary letters, approve the final accounting,
and similar tasks. 130
To be sure, much of this has changed. The small but growing number
of jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code have con-
solidated the probate court as a division of the trial court of general juris-
127. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 501-02. When the transfer is a nonprobate one, death of the
transferor does not prevent a court from intervening to reform the document to conform with the
transferor's presumed intent. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 123, at 524-28.
128. See generally Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: 1, 42
MICH. L. REV. 965 (1944).
129. Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: II, 43 Mim. L. REV.
113, 137-40 (1944). Several years ago, the author had occasion to call the telephone number listed
for a small probate district in Connecticut. The person who answered the telephone said, "Joe's
Auto Body." The probate judge, Joe, was performing surgery on a Volkswagen.
130. Of course, probate judges often had other responsibilities, even when their probate jurisdic-
tion was limited. Many were also charged with guardianship of minors, civil commitment authority,
supervision of testamentary trusts, and, on occasion, marriages and adoptions. Simes & Basye, supra
note 129, at 130-36.
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diction with full adjudicative power. 3 Other states have given the
probate court the powers of a court of general jurisdiction over probate
matters. 132 These changes, however, are relatively recent, and they have
not always applied to all probate districts within a state. 133 Probate
courts and judges in many states still follow the traditional model of lim-
ited jurisdiction and inferior status to at least some degree. More impor-
tantly, formalism became embedded in wills adjudication when the
traditional structure of probate was all but universal. Reforms in probate
jurisdiction, particularly reforms that are so recent, would not necessar-
ily root out formalism unless they removed the stigma of inferiority from
the probate process itself, which they have not.1
34
To the extent that probate courts remain courts of limited jurisdiction
staffed by nonprofessional judges, the division of competence between
probate bodies that perform largely ministerial tasks and trial courts of
general jurisdiction is sensible. After all, few probate matters require liti-
gation. The vast majority of estates present only routine questions that
can be handled ministerially according to formal rules. There is no rea-
son to burden the dockets of trial courts with probate business that does
not require discretionary adjudication and that inferior probate courts
can handle more routinely.
For all their potential convenience, however, courts of limited jurisdic-
tion presided over by lay judges raise problems of control that courts of
general jurisdiction do not. The underlying question is how to limit the
discretion of judges that are not chosen or trained to perform general
adjudicatory functions. The most obvious restriction is the initial limita-
tion of jurisdiction, which defines the competence of probate courts. A
related restriction is to deny probate courts powers that would otherwise
be incident to probate jurisdiction. 35 Still another means of control is to
131. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-302 (1982); see also id. §§ 1-306, 308, 309 (1982).
132. This has long been the practice in New York. See N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. ACT (SBA)
§§ 201, 209 (McKinney 1967).
133. In Texas, for example, except for a handful of so-called "statutory probate courts," see
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(ii) (Vernon 1980), the process of consolidation did not begin until 1973.
See Schwartzel & Wilshusen, Texas Probate Jurisdiction-There's a Will, Where's the Way?, 53 TEX.
L. REV. 323 (1975). Even then, the legislature made substantial distinctions in jurisdiction and
authority according to whether probate matters would fall to county court judges, who did not have
to be attorneys, or district court judges, who did. See 17 M. WOODWARD & E. SMITH, PROBATE
AND DECEDENTS' ESTATES § 1 (Texas Practice 1971).
134. In an analogous area, recent reforms in bankruptcy jurisdiction have not made bankruptcy
judges, nee referees, equal in the eyes of their Article III brethren.
135. For example, until 1973 county courts in Texas had constitutional and statutory authority
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prevent probate courts of limited jurisdiction from hearing contested
matters fully, either by removing such matters to a court of general juris-
diction or by empowering the superior court to try the case again on the
merits rather than limit its review to the questions appealed.1
36
These are the commonly recognized means of controlling the discre-
tion of probate judges that sit in courts of limited jurisdiction. Still an-
other means of control operates, rather paradoxically, at once more
subtly and yet also more heavy-handedly than the structural limitations
just noted. The requirement of strict compliance with the wills act for-
malities limits discretionary interpretation of the formalities by discour-
aging anything other than mechanical, literal application of them. To be
sure, a rule of literal compliance occasions silly and sometimes dishonest
litigation to determine whether particular conduct constitutes compli-
ance with the relevant formality. 137 But this does not limit the utility of
the rule in providing a measure of control over probate courts of limited
jurisdiction. The control persists, however, only so long as supervisory
courts adhere to the requirement of strict compliance. If they relaxed
their guard and accepted anything less than literal compliance, they
would lose much of their ability to correct probate courts that followed
suit. In this respect, the requirement of strict compliance with the for-
malities is another dimension of the channeling function of the formali-
ties themselves. The formalities of due execution provide, as Lon Fuller
observed in a different context, "channels for the legally effective expres-
sion of intention."1 38 They routinize probate by allowing probate courts
to concern themselves only with documents that comply with them. If
this is true, then a rule of literal compliance makes it simpler for supervi-
sory courts to assure that probate courts in fact limit themselves to such
documents. For probate courts of limited jurisdiction staffed by lay
judges, such assurance may be useful.
to transact all business "appertaining to estates," but they could not try title to land or construe
wills. See Schwartzel & Wilshusen, supra note 133, at 335-36, 343.
136. Texas had the latter procedure until 1973. Its effect was to turn trial in the county court
into little more than a discovery proceeding. See Schwartzel & Wilshusen, supra note 133, at 326,
334. In probate courts of limited jurisdiction staffed by nonprofessional judges, contested questions
are beyond the minimal training and skills that probate courts require to function smoothly and
routinely.
137. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 525-26. For a sampling of some of the litigation, on such
questions as whether a grunt or a wave of the hand constitutes acknowledgment, see Annot., 7
A.L.R.3d 317 (1966); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 318 (1961); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 124 (1958); Annot.,
125 A.L.R. 414 (1940); Annot., 115 A.L.R. 689 (1938).
138. Fuller supra note 116, at 801.
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Formalism in wills adjudication may thus provide a means of integrat-
ing an administrative process into an adjudicatory framework. For the
integration to succeed, the functions of probate judges must be clearly
delimited. For example, the administrative decision of what constitutes a
will is guided solely by whether or not the document meets the stipulated
requirements of form. Those requirements-the wills act formalities-
are a set of formally rational criteria for determining what constitutes a
will. The rationality of the rules is formal, not logical. It is not the func-
tion of traditionally limited probate courts to discern the legally relevant
characteristics of the facts of execution through logical analysis of their
meaning. That process is appropriate for adjudication. Rather, it is their
function to adhere to the external characteristics of those facts.1 39 If the
document is in writing, signed by the testator, and attested by two or
more competent witnesses, it is presumptively a will. If a contestant
wishes to argue that, formal compliance notwithstanding, it is not a will,
he or she may litigate the issue. But it is essential to maintaining the
routine of probate for the overwhelming majority of documents that are
not questioned that the contest takes place in a different forum. Deciding
whether an instrument is a will according to formal criteria requires a
fundamentally different mode of analysis from deciding whether a docu-
ment that appears to be a will by formal criteria is in fact not a will
because of substantive considerations such as fraud, undue influence, or
mental incompetence. The latter requires discretionary adjudication; the
former does not.
Perhaps it is in this context that we should view the imposition of
Boren on the probate system. The rule in Boren may have been harsh
and extreme, but it was a rule nonetheless. Quite apart from its merits, if
indeed it had any, as a rule it would keep the ministerial functions of
probate clear and easily administered." It also sharply limited the dis-
cretion of inferior judges in determining matters of attestation-a limita-
tion that probate courts at first resisted. 1 ' The victory, if one can call it
139, My analysis here rests on Max Weber's taxonomy of decision-making in adjudication and
administration. See 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCI-
OLOGY 653-57 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978). For a good recent discussion of Weber's concept
of formal legal rationality, see A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 72-95 (1983).
140. The utility of formal rules is well-known. See Friedman, supra note 118, at 365-78; see
generally Friedman, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw. U.L. REV.
751 (1965). As Weber noted, "Juridical formalism enables the legal system to operate like a techni-
cally rational machine." 2 M. WEBER, supra note 139, at 811.
141. That is, if we can infer resistance (or perhaps simply ignorance) from the fact that it may
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that, of Boren and the formalism it represented may illustrate how super-
visory courts control probate courts of limited jurisdiction-by establish-
ing rules that are easily administered and from which no deviation will be
tolerated. That the rules sometimes may be harsh or even unjust is, from
the impersonal standpoint of administrative efficiency, irrelevant.
By way of contrast, it is useful to note that contests based on lack of
testamentary capacity-a decidedly nonformal ground-do not provide
similar opportunities to control the probate process. When appellate
courts inquire into the testator's intent or mental capacity, they do so
within a framework of procedural controls that removes the question
from probate courts of limited jurisdiction in the first place. Their deci-
sions thus do not interfere with the ministerial functioning of probate
courts, which already will have performed the routine administrative
task of determining the formal validity of the will. Allegations of testa-
mentary incapacity do not attack that determination, but rather the re-
buttable presumptions that follow from it. An appellate finding that the
testator lacked the requisite mental capacity is a substantive decision. It
has no impact on how probate courts apply the wills act formalities in
future cases. That is not the case, however, when an appellate court
decides questions of compliance with the formalities. Those questions
are initially the province of probate courts. When an appellate court de-
termines them, it necessarily redefines the standards by which probate
courts make similar decisions in the future.
Strictly applied formal rules thus permit appellate courts to oversee
the administrative functions of probate and limit the discretion of pro-
bate courts to ministerial matters. Yet it seems anomalous for appellate
judges to decide cases as though they were subject to the same con-
straints as probate judges, especially probate judges of inferior status.
After all, courts that have appellate review of administrative decisions in
nonprobate matters apply judicial standards rather than bureaucratic
ones. For example, federal judges do not normally act as Internal Reve-
nue Service examiners when they decide tax cases. They apply tech-
niques of judicial reasoning and statutory interpretation with little regard
to the effect of their decisions on the administrative functioning of the
IRS. They can do so both because the IRS operates within limits pre-
scribed by Congress and, more significantly, because the IRS has its own
have taken as long as eleven years for probate judges to invalidate uncontested wills for Boren viola-
tions. See supra text accompanying notes 62-81.
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administration, independent of the judicial system, which can adjust in-
ternally to the administrative burden of judicial decisions. In wills adju-
dication, however, the traditional structure of the probate process has
meant that doctrinal consistency is not the only concern of supervisory
courts. They have also had to control the discretion of a class of judges
that includes many who are not trained to exercise it or whom the super-
visory courts perceive as not qualified to exercise it.
The problem of controlling administrative discretion by adjudicatory
means may explain excessive formalism of the kind applied to self-prov-
ing affidavits in Texas. An explanation is not, of course, a justification.
Formalism of the degree evidenced in Boren and Fleming is as unforgiv-
able as it is unforgiving.142 It does not distinguish between formal de-
fects that compromise the integrity of the document and those that are
harmless in terms of their effect on the underlying functions.
To the extent that formalism in wills adjudication is structural in ori-
gin rather than doctrinal or functional, it has behind it the force of judi-
cial inertia.143 Reforms such as those of the Uniform Probate Code that
enhance the jurisdiction and authority of probate courts are undoubtedly
142. This is true even though the estate of a testator whose will is found invalid will pass by
intestate succession rather than escheat to the state. Langbein has discussed this "backstopping"
effect of intestate distribution statutes. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 499-501. The various state
intestate succession schemes represent legislative judgments on what should be done with the prop-
erty of people who fail to decide the matter themselves. In fact, the statutory distributions tend to
follow what most testators do in their wills anyway-provide for their immediate families. Whether
the statutes distribute the estates in the same proportion as testators would or as people would expect
is another question altogether--one that empirical studies usually answer negatively. See, e.g., M.
SUSSMAN, J. CATES, & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 83-120 (1970); Dunham, The
Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241 (1963);
Fellows, Simon, & Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succes-
sion Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 319; Fellows, Simon, Snapp, &
Snapp, An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate Plan, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 717; Note, Intes-
tate Succession in New Jersey: Does It Conform to Popular Expectations?, 12 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROS. 253 (1976).
The existence of intestate succession doubtless makes it easier for courts to invalidate wills. The
Supreme Court of California once declared when it invalidated a will for defective attestation that
"[i]n the absence of any will, the law makes a wise, liberal, and beneficent distribution of the dead
man's estate; so wise, indeed, that the policy of permitting wills at all is often gravely questioned."
In re Walker's Estate, 110 Cal. 387, 391, 42 P. 815, 818 (1895). On rehearing, the court modified its
opinion by deleting that sentence and a similar one. In re Walker's Estate, 42 P. 1082 (1896) (per
curiam). Nonetheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that people who write wills intend to die
testate and would probably find the presumptive fairness of intestate distribution irrelevant.
143. Sometimes it is tempting to speculate on the source of the inertia. For example, the author
of the Boren opinion voted with the majority in Fleming seventeen years later. It will be interesting
to see if his recent retirement has any effect on future wills cases.
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useful, but the probate process will not lose its stigma of inferiority
merely by legislative fiat. The habits and perceptions fostered by control-
ling ministerial discretion by adjudicatory means run too deep. Func-
tional and doctrinal analyses of formalism are necessary and worthwhile,
but they are inevitably incomplete. A structural analysis such as the one
offered here may enhance our understanding of formalism in wills adju-
dication. If it does, it may, in time, help lessen the punctiliousness that
produces injustice.
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